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The Challenge For Itamaraty: An answer to to Ambassador Gonçalo Mello 
Mourão’s “Seria a política externa um problema para a Itamaraty?” 
Dr Sean W. Burges1 
 
In his rebuttal of my January 2013 analysis of Itamaraty and the formation and 
implementation of Brazilian foreign policy (Seria o Itamaraty um problema para a 
política externa brasileira?), Ambassador Gonçalo Mello Mourão ends with a telling 
metaphor which nicely supports the larger point I originally made. Comparing the role of 
Brazilian diplomats with that of cardiac surgeon, Ambassador Mourão writes: “… todos 
devem poder contribuir para a formulação da política externa. O cirurgião cardíaco deve 
ouvir o pneumólogo, o anestaesista, o hematólogo e outros especialistas com muito 
cuidado, antes de operar; mas quem opera o coração com bisturi certeiro com algum 
sucesso, é ele, não o dentista.” 
 
My original article reflected complaints about Itamaraty attitudes and procedures voiced 
to me repeatedly in over a decade of conversations with Brazilian diplomats, government 
officials in other ministries on the Esplanada, academic colleagues in Brazil, 
representatives of Brazilian business and industry, and similar individuals and 
organizations in Europe, North America, Africa and the Antipodes. To draw on 
Ambassador Mourão’s parting metaphor, the critique I repeatedly heard was not about 
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the innate capability of Itamaraty diplomats or their ability to implement and deliver the 
policies outcomes mandated by Brazil’s political leadership, but rather the persistence of 
something similar to the God-complex frequently attributed to surgeons by others in the 
medical profession. A widely held perception appears to be that Itamaraty is reluctant to 
listen to outside expertise and accept a ‘democratic’ opening of foreign affairs in the 
sense that it would throw open the doors to more actors and organizations as foreign 
policy formulating and implementing bodies. Instead, in an approach that almost echoes 
the gradual opening of politics during Brazil’s democratic transition in the 1980s, 
‘democracy’ in foreign affairs appears as something for Itamaraty to carefully manage, 
keeping this area of public policy apart from most commonly accepted understandings of 
democratic discourse and practice. Foreign policy, in short, is quietly positioned as the 
exclusive preserve of the ‘professionals’, creating a reality that Itamaraty has been 
allowed to perpetuate. 
 
The comparison with a cardiac surgeon is thus particularly apt. The cardiac surgeon is a 
highly skilled craftsman with an expertise that takes many years to develop. But, the 
critical point is that the surgeon is operating because other medical professionals have 
deemed it a necessary risk and thus recommended the procedure. Tellingly for 
Ambassador Mourão’s metaphor, there is a clear recognition in the medical literature that 
oral disease may be the first indicator of severe underlying cardiac conditions, meaning 
that the presence of severe heart ailments are often first identified by the attending dentist 
(Humphrey et al, 2008). Thus, while it certainly makes no sense to have the dentist 
undertake the surgery, there is a good chance that it is the dentist who will identify the 
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potential need for an operation long before the surgeon realizes that there might be a 
problem. 
 
In part the questions I raised relate to what role the diplomat/surgeon should play in the 
‘diagnosis’ and prescription of ‘treatment’ to address Brazilian foreign policy challenges, 
particularly through democratic political processes, which in an ideal world involves 
active discussion amongst political, economic, social and civil society actors with and 
independent from the foreign ministry and government. The argument I made in my 
article is not that there is a deficiency in Itamaraty’s ability to quickly and effectively 
implement foreign policies decided by political leadership. Indeed, Ambassador Mourão 
admirably sets out Itamaraty successes in areas such as expansion of South American 
regional plans, increased diplomatic representation in Africa, and the launch of a 
Brazilian South-South Cooperation program.  
 
Rather, I asked questions about how Itamaraty is responding to major and fast changes in 
how foreign relations take place at a formal and informal level and what this means for 
Brazil’s foreign policy and future position regionally and globally. The proposition I raise 
is that the international context has, as Ambassador Antonio Patriota (2013) observes in 
the same issue carrying Ambassador Mourão’s opinion, changed markedly over the last 
decade. Building on this I suggest that it might be worth at least re-examining and 
possibly rethinking some of the key understandings at the heart of Brazilian foreign 
policy even if the exercise results in no substantive changes.  
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For example, the suggestion that regional integration approaches be re-examined, 
particularly Mercosul, is not new in Brazil. Indeed, this question was directly addressed 
by Ambassador Botafogo Gonçalves (2013) just pages from my own paper. More telling 
is Ambassador Mourão’s rebuttal of my treatment of Brazil’s Responsibilidade ao 
Proteger. While the Ambassador is correct that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has 
a serious weakness when it comes to justifying why it applies in one case and not another 
(never mind the thorny question of who will provide the troops for intervention), it also 
points directly to why there is grounds for revisiting understandings of non-intervention 
and sovereignty even if the end result is no change in the policy position. The underlying 
principle in question is that of self-determination, which implies that the people within a 
country determine their own future. With Libya and Syria in mind, what if the country is 
autocratically, not democratically governed? More to the point, what if the government of 
the country in question is perpetrating atrocities against substantial segments of its 
population? Does this mean there should be a modification or moderation in the Brazilian 
position? How do these lamentably common possibilities sit with the foreign policy of a 
strong democratic state such as Brazil?  
 
In many respects what I was asking is if there should be a repeat of the sort of core 
“concept review” undertaken in 1992 and 1993, leading to the document Reflexões Sobre 
a Política Externa Brasileira (IPRI, 1993). Perhaps the sharpest critique of my 
suggestion has come from Professor Dawisson Belém Lopes, who points out that 
Itamaraty remains subservient to the presidency and as such we should have very limited 
expectations for and desire to see diplomatic creativity from the foreign ministry. On a 
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strictly constitutionalist basis this critique is sharp and on the mark. Indeed the Reflexões 
exercise happened at the direction of a politically appointed minister, not a career 
diplomat. Significantly for some of Ambassador Mourão’s arguments, the Reflexões 
report also reaffirmed some of the core propositions guiding Brazil’s foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, the exercise in auto-critica was still directed by and through Itamaraty. 
Although representatives from universities and the business community were invited to 
participate in some of the seminars, interpretations of these contributions were still 
geared towards reaffirming Itamaraty hegemony on the formulation of foreign policy, not 
just its implementation. 
 
With this in mind, the issue is not really one of legal interpretation and appropriate levels 
of institutional entrepreneurship, but rather one of understanding the intellectual and 
policy space Itamaraty occupies in the formulation and understanding of the underlying 
concepts and the practice of foreign policy in Brazil. The conundrum is captured by 
Professor Belém Lopes in his excellent book Política Externa e Democracia no Brasil. In 
a democratic country foreign policy is but one of a number of areas of public policy, each 
of which brings a particular set of restraints, traditions, and varying levels of political 
interest. Democratization brings pressure from different actors for wider participation in 
the policy-making process, which in the Itamaraty case represents a challenge to its 
authority: “Embora não disponhamos de elementos objetivos para afirmar que a 
democratização da PEB seja tendência indesejável para o Ministério de Relações 
Exteriores do Brasil e seus membros, cumpre reconhecer que essa burocracia tem sabido 
absorver muito do impacto proveniente das pressões por mais democracia, convertendo-
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as, frequentemente, em insumo de legitimidade para uma condução (ainda) aristocrática 
da política exterior do Estado brasileiro” (Belem Lopes, 2013b: 268). In other words, 
there is a sense that the effort has been to ensure that foreign policy remains something 
best left to the professionals while simultaneously embracing the democratization of 
public policy. 
 
The tensions on this front have led to a gathering wave of criticism of Itamaraty. Setting 
aside media stories that complain about diplomatic salaries and adherence to transparency 
legislation, we find a rapidly growing body of Brazilian scholarly and policy literature 
examining Itamaraty shortcomings and the extent to which non-traditional actors are 
engaging directly in foreign relations (Tavares, 2013; Pinheiro and Milani, 2012; 2013; 
Pinheiro, 2009: Faria, Belem Lopes, Casaroes, 2013). Glimpses of why this tide of 
complaints exist can be found in the publications by Brazil’s highest ranking diplomats, 
as quietly demonstrated by Ambassador Celso Amorim (2013: 81-82), who recently 
hinted at coordinated efforts to ensure that a diplomat remained the key WTO negotiator, 
not an official from the Ministério de Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior.  
 
As Ambassador Mourão points out, Itamaraty has undertaken substantial activities to 
increase public, political and bureaucratic engagement with foreign policy. The books 
published by the Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão are an important contribution to policy 
and scholarly debate. Seminars coordinated by the Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações 
Internacionais result in stimulating discussions and publications that often reaffirm 
existing policy trajectories. Itamaraty officials also frequently appear before the Senate’s 
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Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional, although it should be remembered 
that many of these appearances are a legal requirement and part of the system of 
democratic checks and balances, not a concession to democratization offered by the 
foreign ministry. Further developments took place in 2013 with Minister Antonio 
Patriota’s proposal of a regular civil society dialogue and a revamping of Itamaraty’s 
Facebook, Twitter and Youtube presence. 
 
On one level Itamaraty thus appears to be engaged in a real and positive process of 
inciting debate and engaging with the Brazilian people and interest groups. But a central 
problem here is that this also means that Itamaraty is leading and thus controlling the 
democratization of this area of public policy. This in turn raises the question of how deep 
Itamaraty consultation is and what actual impact it has on policy content. On this front 
Professor Oliver Stuenkel (2013) has raised some important questions about the efficacy 
of Itamaraty’s social media use. His colleague at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de 
Janeiro, Professor Matias Spektor (2013a), has pushed the point further by lauding 
Itamaraty’s renewed engagement with civil society, but also warning that “existe o risco 
de o novo foro ser esvaziado. O ministro será tentado a usar sua criatura para informar e 
convencer a sociedade, não para consultá-la e ajustar o que precisa ser ajustado.” Indeed, 
such a strategy is a well-established favourite in bureaucracies the world over. Early 
suggestions were that the current foreign minister, Ambassador Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, 
has cancelled the process (Paraguassu, 2014), although further clarification came in his 6 
February 2014 testimony before the Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional 
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do Senado Federal where he explained that consultation was important and would happen 
once procedural terms could be agreed with the interested parties.  
 
As Professor Leticia Pinheiro (2007: 7) notes, there is a major issue with the place that 
diplomats hold in Brazil’s foreign policy debate. The intellectual production from 
Itamaraty has had a tendency to focus on either explaining why a decision was sound or 
searching out the most efficient method of implementing a decision that has already been 
made, not innovating or formulating major new policy directions or understandings. To 
emphasize this point, she turns to Gelson Fonseca (1998: 263), quoting: “tanto Itamaraty 
como as Forças Armadas ‘pensam’ em função de interesses, de uma determinada visão de 
seu papel como burocracias permanentes … faltando, por isso mesmo, ao seu pensamento 
as condições de originalidade e de sentido critico que normalmente devem trazer as 
interpretações intelectuais ou acadêmicos da realidade.” For Professor Pinheiro (2007: 
15) the tendency in Brazil to accept the writings of diplomats as scientific production and 
not primary documents reflecting the internal logic and priorities of Itamaraty creates a 
situation that carries “serious political as well as academic consequences for the teaching 
and learning of Brazilian Foreign Policy and International Relations.” The contention I 
am reinforcing here simply extends Professor Pinheiro’s concerns out from the academy 
and into a wider political and policy space. 
 
My argument is not that the publications and public activities of Brazilian diplomats lack 
scholarly merit – one of the delights of researching Brazilian foreign policy is conversing 
with the brilliant minds at Itamaraty – but that the intellectual firepower of Itamaraty is 
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deployed in a very specific manner which brings its own sets of limitations, a point that 
the current IPRI Director has himself recently acknowledged (Lima, 2014). A widespread 
failure to acknowledge this and to intellectually distinguish the policy-supporting 
writings of diplomats from scholars and policy pundits has created a situation that 
perpetuates the traditional position of Itamaraty as a sort of final arbiter on foreign affairs, 
creating an environment that does not so much prevent innovation and new policy 
directions as cow into submission the potential protagonists of these new ideas. Itamaraty 
is thus left as an island apart, master of a policy space into which others tread only with 
trepidation and reticence for fear of swift and forceful castigation. 
 
One consequence is a perception amongst academics, citizens and legislators that 
Congress has very little influence on foreign affairs (Anastasia, Mendonça, e Almeida, 
2012). The extent to which Itamaraty has successfully walled off foreign affairs as a 
unique area of expertise in the minds of Brazilian politicians was bluntly highlighted by 
Senator José Jorge during a 2005 Commission debate on President Lula’s South 
American policies: “na realidade, com exceção da Comissão de Relações Exteriores e 
Defesa Nacional, o Plenário nunca discutiu política externa brasileira porque o Congresso 
sempre confiou no Itamaraty. Sempre se confiou no Ministério das Relações Exteriores 
porque é uma instituição extremamente profissionalizada, os embaixadores são 
escolhidos por critérios técnicos e são pessoas experientes em quem confiamos” (Senado 
2005: 277). The rest of the Committee debate reinforces the point that the quasi-
intellectual status of Itamaraty publications and a tradition of not pressing the 
professionals effectively curtails a more probing discussion of Brazilian foreign policy. 
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While bemoaning the lack of a real grappling with Brazilian foreign policy, members of 
the Committee made it clear that they had utter faith in the ability of the diplomats to 
successfully fulfill their mission. The issue, as outlined above, is that in the realm of 
foreign policy the distinction between the operational and the conceptual are blurred, 
closing down a serious and detailed congressional examination of the latter. 
 
Thus, in answer to Ambassador Mourão’s revised question “Seria a política externa 
brasileira um problema para o Itamaraty,” the answer clearly has to be a strong ‘no’ 
because to argue otherwise would fly in the face of the professionalism that is the 
hallmark of o Casa do Rio Branco. The question I was seeking to raise is, as I hope I have 
further outlined here, significantly more complicated and might be rephrased as one of 
“has Brazil become overly reliant on Itamaraty for foreign policy thinking and direction?” 
Reframed this way the critique I offered still has implications for Itamaraty public 
engagement and implementation processes for the reasons outlined above. But it is the 
questions the critique raises for Brazil’s political leadership that are more penetrating.  
 
The extent to which things are changing and Itamaraty adopting a more ecumenical and 
open approach to foreign policy thinking may currently be undergoing a bit of a test if the 
rumours of writing a ‘Livro Branco de Política Externa’ are true (Spektor, 2013b), 
although reports suggest that it will have the same Itamaraty domination that marked the 
1993 Reflexões report and thus skirt the central issues about democracy and foreign 
policy that I and, more significantly, many of my Brazilian colleagues are raising. While 
the ‘aristocracy’ of Brazilian foreign policy may still be housed in the Itamaraty Palace, 
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there is a rising and increasingly vocal range of scholars, businessmen and civil society 
actors in Brazil questioning the daily operation and core precepts of their country’s 
foreign policy. The danger which I sought to highlight in my article is that the ‘cardiac 
surgeons’ in the Itamaraty Palace might shut out the myriad of highly qualified Brazilian 
‘dentists’ from the discussion and thus miss a critical diagnosis or innovative and more 
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